In this paper, we study the time consistent strategies in the mean-variance portfolio selection with short-selling prohibition in both discrete and continuous time settings. Recently, [T. Björk, A. Murgoci, and X. Y. Zhou, Math. Finance, 24 (2014), pp. 1-24] considered the problem with state dependent risk aversion in the sense that the risk aversion is inversely proportional to the current wealth, and they showed that the time consistent control is linear in wealth. Considering the counterpart of their continuous time equilibrium control in the discrete time framework, the corresponding "optimal" wealth process can take negative values; and this negativity in wealth will lead the investor to a risk seeker which results in an unbounded value function that is economically unsound; even more, the limiting of the discrete solutions has shown to be their obtained continuous solution in , Sweden, 2010]) makes us also conclude that the continuous time equilibrium control is also linear in wealth with investment to wealth ratio satisfying an integral equation uniquely. We also show that the discrete time equilibrium controls converge to that in continuous time setting. Finally, in numerical studies, we illustrate that the constrained strategy in continuous setting can outperform the unconstrained one in some situations as depicted in Figure 8 .
equations. Rather than constraining the portfolio, [12] studied the investment and consumption problem with no bankruptcy, i.e., negative wealth prohibition. To our knowledge, there is still very limited theoretical study via the time-consistent approach on the time-inconsistent control problem with constraints; though [11] studied the mean-variance problem via the time-consistent approach with constraints in investment policy, they provided only a numerical study on determining the time-consistent solution but not in any analytic form.
In section 2, we review the unconstrained mean-variance portfolio selection in both the continuous time and discrete time frameworks via the time-consistent approach; also in this section, the economic limitation of the corresponding discrete counterpart of the continuous model (as studied by [4] ) without short-selling constraints becomes apparent. In section 3, we introduce the formulation of the discrete time mean-variance portfolio selection problem. In section 4, we solve for the discrete time problem by using backward recursion and establish the equilibrium control in Theorem 4.1. In section 5, we introduce the formulation of the continuous time mean-variance problem and state the corresponding extended HJB equations for the mean-variance problem in Theorem 5.1. In section 6, we make use of a suitable ansatz in solving for the extended HJB system obtained in Theorem 5.1, and then we prove the existence and the uniqueness of the solution in Theorems 6.1 and 6.2. Furthermore, by utilizing the results in section 3, we also show that the equilibrium controls of a sequence of canonical discrete time models as stated in Theorem 6.4 will converge to the equilibrium control of the continuous time model as introduced in section 5. Numerical simulation will be provided by comparing the performance of different constraints in control in section 7, and we conclude in section 8. The main technical details in Theorems 5.1 and 6.4 are given in the appendices.
Unconstrained time-consistent optimization.
In the mean-variance portfolio selection problem with wealth dependent risk aversion, we seek an optimal control u to maximize the following objective functional:
in which the wealth dynamic dX u t = (rX u t + αu t )dt + σu t dW t , where γ is a risk-aversion coefficient, r is the riskless return rate, α := μ − r represents the net appreciation rate of the risky asset with μ being the appreciation rate of the risky asset, σ is the volatility rate of the risky asset, and finally W t represents Brownian motion. For the sake of simplifying notation, we denote that E t,x [X u T ] = E[X u T |X t = x] and V ar t,x [X u T ] = V ar[X u T |X t = x]. The class of all admissible controls, U c , is the collection of all real-valued Markovian controls.
Note that the objective functional J is nonlinear in E t,x [X u T ], which cannot be linearly separated from initial state in J, and so the corresponding optimization problem is time inconsistent in the sense that the Bellman optimality principle does not hold (see [3] ); that is, though any obtained optimal control can optimize J at time 0, the same control cannot guarantee the optimality of J at all future times.
To deal with similar time-inconsistent optimization problems, it is getting popular in the recent literature to formulate the problem as a noncooperative game (with each time point as a player) and then look for a certain control in the equilibrium sense: in [3] and [10] , the following definition of equilibrium control is provided in the class of all Markovian controls for the time-inconsistent control problem in the continuous time setting as follows; a similar definition of equilibrium control in the discrete setting will be given in Definition 2.3. Definition 2.1. A Markovian controlû is said to be an equilibrium control if for every u ∈ U c ,
where u h is given by
By solving for the HJB system in accordance with Definition 2.1 in [4] , they obtain the following.
Theorem 2.2. The Markovian controlû(t, x) = c(t)x is an equilibrium one for (2.1), where c(t) ∈ C[0, T ] uniquely solves for the integral equation:
Note that this equilibrium solution is linear in the current wealth x. Define t n := n , where := T N . Next, we consider the discrete time analogue of the portfolio selection problem with wealth dependent risk aversion in (2.1). The objective functional is defined as
Considering the continuous time dynamics of bond price B t and stock price S t , by the direct application of Itô's formula, the changes of bond price and stock price over a step are given, respectively, by
Therefore, the dynamic of the wealth at time t n , X n , is governed by
in which u n represents the control at time t n . Again, we denote that E n,
The set of all admissible controls, U d , is the collection of all real-valued Markovian controls. As before, this optimization problem is time inconsistent, which motivates us to look for the equilibrium (time-consistent; see [3] and [20] ) control as defined next.
Definition 2.3. A Markovian controlû is said to be an equilibrium control if for every
where u is given by
For further motivations of Definitions 2.1 and 2.3, and for the game theoretic approach on tackling some other time-inconsistent problems, one can consult [3] , [10] , and [20] .
For any x > 0, the optimization problem (2.3) admits a unique equilibrium control: Theorem 2.4. The equilibrium controlû is given byû n (x) = C n x, where
and A n and B n can be obtained recursively by
A proof of Theorem 2.4 is obtained by solving forû by backward recursion; the approach is similar to that of Theorem 4.1 below, and the details are omitted. Furthermore, the solution in this discrete time model will converge to that in the continuous time setting as N goes to infinity:
Theorem 2.5. If c(t) is the solution of integral equation in Theorem 2.2 and C n are given in Theorem 2.4, then there exists K > 0 independent of both n and N such that |C n −c(t n )| < K .
Again we skip the details of the proof since it is almost the same as that of Theorem 6.4 below.
Remark 2.6. The solution in this discrete time framework relies on the assumption that x > 0. Since the equilibrium control can take any real values, it is plausible that the ratio of the risky investment to wealth under the adoption of the equilibrium control, C tn , lies outside [0, 1], i.e., short-selling happens. In this scenario, even though the equilibrium control is linear in wealth, we cannot eliminate the possibility that in the next period the wealth takes nonpositive value:
In the continuous time framework, the equilibrium control of an unconstrained problem is linear in wealth, and now the wealth process becomes a geometric Brownian motion which avoids the possibility of getting negative. In contrast, the negative wealth may happen in the discrete time framework; however, its solution converges to that in the continuous time framework.
The negative wealth will then reinforce the investor to become a risk seeker, which seems to be counterintuitive. Furthermore, negative wealth also makes the wealth dependent risk aversion γ x economically unsound; namely, the investor could be very risk averse when he has $0.1 in his pocket, while the investor becomes a strong risk seeker when he owes $0.1. It sounds economically irrational that the investor behaves dramatically different just for this 0.2 dollar of difference! Third, mathematically, the optimal objective functional in (2.3) will be unbounded under negative risk aversion. Thus, if we model the risk aversion to be inversely proportional to the wealth, we have to restrict plausible trading strategies that avoid bankruptcy.
It is usual to implement the portfolio management in a discrete time framework. The equilibrium strategy in an unconstrained discrete time framework can result in bankruptcy. It can also cause the loss of concavity of the mean-variance utility at some time, and thus its control cannot be implemented in a discrete time framework. Therefore, it is economically questionable that the unethical discrete time strategy will converge to the equilibrium control in [4] defined among all continuous time no bankruptcy strategies.
To overcome this anomaly, in the rest of this paper, to eliminate the chance of negative wealth, the admissible controls have to be constrained so that no short selling is allowed. We next consider the portfolio selection problem under short-selling prohibition in both discrete and continuous time frameworks.
Problem setting: Discrete time.
Given the probability space (Ω, F, P), E denotes the expectation with respect to real-life probability measure P. The values of bonds and stocks are given by n ∈ T := {0, 1, . . . , N − 1},
where r n > 0 is the deterministic riskless return rate. R n is the positive random return rate of the stock, where μ n := E[R n ] and σ 2 n := V ar[R n ]. Also assume that R i and R j are independent for any i = j. Define F n := σ(R i , i ≤ n) and F = ∪ N n=0 F n . Denote u n to be the amount of money invested on the stock at time n; the corresponding wealth process X u n satisfies (3.1)
Also we confine our control u n by
where 0 ≤ p n ≤ q n ≤ 1, subject to which short selling is not allowed, and the wealth has to be positive. Define the class of admissible controls U d [p,q] := {u n |p n X n ≤ u n ≤ q n X n , n ∈ T }. The objective functional is defined as
, and the risk-aversion coefficient γ n > 0 for all n ∈ T . From the dynamics of the wealth process, we have
where α n := μ n − r n . We now look for the equilibrium solution as defined in Definition 2.3 for this J(n, x; u) in (3.3) under the dynamic (3.1) and constraint (3.2) (here we use U d [p,q] instead of U d ).
Remark 3.1. The present problem is more general than the problem for (2.3) in the previous section except the additional constraint on all admissible controls. Besides, we here allow both the time varying of parameters and the risky return rate to be an arbitrary random variable. If one takes r n = e r and R n = e (μ− 1 2 σ 2 ) +σ(Wt n+1 −Wt n ) , the dynamics of the wealth process in two models coincide, and the independence of R i and R j for all i = j follows from the stationary independent increments of Brownian motion. Moreover, for p n = 0 and q n = 1 for all n, constraint (3.2) is the standard short-selling prohibition.
Equilibrium solution for the discrete time problem. Define f, g as
Theorem 4.1. The equilibrium control for the objective functional (3.3) subject to the dynamics (3.1) and constraint (3.2),û, is given by
where C n is defined as follows: for n < N,
and A n and B n can be obtained recursively as
4)
A N = 1; (4.5)
and G n is a layer function defined as the following:
Also, we have
and B n > 0, (4.10)
for all n ∈ T .
Note that if (4.8) and (4.9) hold, (4.10) and (4.11) can be interpreted in this way: B n represents the coefficients of x 2 for the conditional second moment of the terminal wealth up to time n, while B n − A 2 n represents the coefficients of x 2 for the conditional variance of the terminal wealth up to time n. And hence both of them should be nonnegative.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Our proof relies on backward induction. It is trivial that (4.8)-(4.11) hold for n = N . Assume that (4.3), (4.8)-(4.11) hold for n ≥ k + 1, and we now turn to establishing their validity for n = k. Let u = (u k ,û k+1 , . . . ,û N ); by using the notion of (4.1) and (4.2) and the tower property,
Since (4.8) and (4.9) hold for n = k + 1, we have
The equilibrium control at k can be obtained by maximizing the above quadratic function of u k . From the hypothesis that (4.10) and (4.11) hold for n = k + 1, this quadratic function is strictly concave in u k . By the first order condition, the quadratic function is maximized by adopting (4.3); so (4.3) holds for n = k. Furthermore,
Hence, (4.8) and (4.9) hold for n = k.
Therefore, (4.10) and (4.11) hold for n = k, and the claim follows by backward induction.
Problem setting: Continuous time model motivated by the discrete framework.
Given the probability space (Ω, F, P), E denotes the expectation with respect to P, and W t denotes the standard P-Brownian motion. The values of bonds and stocks are given by
where r t is the riskless return rate, and μ t and σ t are the appreciation and the volatility rates of the stock, respectively. Also assume that r t , μ t , and σ t are locally Lipschitz continuous and
The Markovian admissible controls are confined by the constraint
where p t and q t are locally Lipschitz continuous functions. Define the class of all admissible
where T < ∞ and risk-aversion coefficient γ t is assumed to be positive and differentiable with bounded derivative. The definition of equilibrium control in the continuous time setting is given in Definition 2.1 (here we use U c [p,q] instead of U c ). We can define the equilibrium value function by equilibrium control:
By the extended HJB system and its corresponding verification theorem derived in [3] , we have the following extended HJB system and the verification theorem for objective function J(t, x; u) in (5.3) subject to (5.1) and (5.2). Theorem 5.1 (verification theorem). Suppose that there are functions V, g,û :
such that they satisfy the following system of equations:
where the supremum in the first equation is attained atû(t, x) for all x ∈ R + .
Thenû is an equilibrium control law for J(t, x; u) in (5.3) subject to (5.1) and (5.2), and V is the corresponding equilibrium value function. Moreover, f and g have the following probabilistic representations:
The proof of the above theorem is given in Appendix A. Remark 5.2. The problem setting in this section allows a time varying parameter. It is more general than (2.1) except the constraint on the control. If we take p t = 0 and q t = 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ], constraint (5.2) is a standard short-selling prohibition.
Equilibrium control in continuous time problem.
By considering the equilibrium control in the discrete time setting, we apply the following ansatz to the equilibrium control in the continuous time problem:û = c(t)x.
By the probabilistic representation in (5.10), we consider the following expression for f and g:
By direct calculations, these f and g can be shown to satisfy (5.5) and (5.6) . Furthermore, we also have the following expression for V :
x.
Standard derivation gives
Substituting these derivatives into (5.4), we have a concave quadratic equation
The first order condition gives us with optimalû
where G t is a layer function defined as the following:
Since p t and q t are Lipschitz continuous, the layer function G t is jointly Lipschitz:
By comparing coefficients of (6.4) andû = c(t)x, we ought to have c(t) to satisfy the integral equation
3), (6.2), and (6.1), respectively, andû
then V, f, g,û satisfy the HJB system given by (5.4)-(5.9). Moreover, by the verification theorem (Theorem 5.1),û is an equilibrium control law, V is an equilibrium value function, and f, g have probabilistic representation as in (5.10).
Proof. Equations (5.5)-(5.9) are obviously satisfied by the choices of f , g, andû as in (6.2) and (6.1). By (6.4) and the concavity, we have shown that the supremum of (5.4) is attained atû. We only have to show (5.4); indeed, by the choices of f , g, and V as in (6.2), (6.1), and (6.3), we have
and thus we can express the following derivatives of V as
Replacing u byû, the (5.4) can be rewritten as
The last equality follows from (5.5) and (5.6) .
What remains now is to verify whether the integral equation (6.6) admits a unique solution in C[0, T ].
Theorem 6.2. The integral equation (6.6) admits a unique solution c ∈ C[0, T ]. Remark 6.3. The existence proof of integral equation (6.6) in Theorem 6.2 and the integral equation in [4] are similar. We both construct an iteration scheme for the integral equation and establish the existence of a convergence subsequence in accordance with the Arzela-Ascoli theorem. On the other hand, in [4] , it does not seem clear enough on showing the limit of the subsequence actually satisfying the integral equation; indeed, just a subsequential convergence does not suffice to take the limit on both sides of the corresponding recursive relation. In our proof of Theorem 6.2, we conclude that the limit of the subsequence is the limit of the sequence by showing that the iteration (6.7) is actually Cauchy. Nevertheless, we can similarly show that the corresponding iteration scheme in [4] is also Cauchy in spite of Theorem 4.9 in [4] .
Proof of Theorem 6.2. In the following, for the sake of notation, K represents different constants at different lines. The proof is based on an application of the Arzela-Ascoli theorem. Construct a sequence c n ∈ C[0, T ] as follows:
, c n is uniformly bounded by 0 and 1 in [0, T ]. We next show that {c n } is equicontinuous. Note that all r t , α t , σ t , γ t are Lipschitz continuous (since γ t has bounded derivative), and so they are uniformly bounded on [0, T ]. Define
The equicontinuity of {c n } follows if we can show that d n (t) is uniformly bounded and d n (t) is Lipschitz continuous:
Therefore, d n (t) is uniformly bounded. Furthermore,
The Arzela-Ascoli theorem concludes with the existence of a subsequence c n k and c : [0, T ] → R such that c n k → c ∈ C[0, T ] uniformly on [0, T ]. Next, we shall show that for any t ∈ [0, T ], {c n (t)} n∈N is a Cauchy sequence, so c n (t) → c(t) uniformly. Definec n := c n − c n−1 . By definition, c n is bounded by 0 and 1 uniformly on [0, T ], and so By induction, we can deduce that
By (6.12) again, we have
Then, given a large integer n, for any m > n, we have Hence, we can conclude that {c n (t)} n∈N is a uniformly Cauchy sequence and c is the uniform limit of c n . Then taking the limit on both sides of (6.7), c is the solution of (6.6). For the uniqueness, assume that c 1 and c 2 are the solution of (6.6). Again, c 1 and c 2 are bounded by 0 and 1 uniformly on [0, T ], and by using the same approach as in (6.12), we have
Finally, Gronwall's inequality concludes that c 1 = c 2 on [0, T ]. Next, we consider the convergence of the results from discrete time to that in the continuous time framework. The dynamic of wealth process in the discrete time model is
Here, the riskless return rate is e t n+1 tn rsds , and the risky return rate is e t n+1 tn
σsdWs . Take the coefficients p n , q n , γ n , r n , μ n , σ n , and α n as p n = p tn , q n = q tn , γ n = γ tn , r n = e 
Define a(t) and b(t) as follows:
thus a(t) and b(t) are differentiable, and a(t) and b(t) are solutions to the ODE system a (t) + (r t + α t c(t)) a(t) = 0, (6.15) a(T ) = 1; (6.16)
Since the coefficients of this ODE system are all bounded uniformly on [0, T ], a(t) and b(t) are their unique solutions. Then c(t) can be expressed in term of a(t) and b(t):
We have the following convergent theorem, which states that C n as obtained in Theorem 4.1 converges to c(t n ) as obtained in (6.6) as goes to 0, where the coefficients in the discrete time model are given in (6.13). The above representation of c(t) in terms of a(t) and b(t) can motivate the proof of this convergence result. Theorem 6.4. For every fixed (small) > 0, if c(t) is the solution of the integral equation (6.6) and C n are given as in Theorem 4.1 with the coefficients as defined in (6.13), then there exists K > 0, independent of n, such that |C n − c(t n )| < K .
The proof of Theorem 6.4 is given in Appendix B.
Numerical simulation.
In this section, we compare the performance under different constraints on the investment to wealth ratio. In the first subsection, we investigate the effect of constraints, and we shall compare the equilibrium investment to wealth ratio and value function against t. In the second subsection, for different models of γ(t), we shall compare the equilibrium investment to wealth ratio and value function at t = 0 and x = 1 against T . In the third subsection, we compare the mean-variance distribution representing the conditional expectation and conditional variance for varying risk-aversion coefficients. At the same time, we compare the performance of three investors: the first investor allows short selling (unconstrained investor), the second investor disallows short selling (constrained investor), and the third investor disallows short selling and invests at most half of his wealth into risky assets (conservative investor); the performance of an investor, who puts his wealth only in riskless assets, is augmented as a reference.
We set the risk-aversion coefficient γ(t) to be time varying, as is usual for an investor being relatively less risk averse if the time to the expiry is still long, which we model γ(t) by using the following logit function with known parameters k 1 and k 2 :
gives the risk-aversion coefficient when the time is at the expiry date and it is the maximum risk aversion. Larger k 2 will lead to more significant change in risk aversion as the time to the expiry is larger, so that the risk aversion of the long term investor will be smaller for larger k 2 . Also, we fix r = 0.05, μ = 0.2, and σ = 0.2.
For the computation of investment to wealth ratio, the equilibrium value function, and the conditional expected value and conditional variance with equilibrium control for the unconstrained investor, refer to [4] . For the constrained investor, we first set p t = 0 and q t = 1, then the investment to wealth ratio can be found from c(t) in (6.6), and the equilibrium value function is given in (6.3) . The computation details for the conservative investor can similarly be found by setting p t = 0 and q t = 0.5.
Since obtaining the investment to wealth ratio c(t) directly from (6.6) is not immediate, instead, the investment to wealth ratio, c(t; T ), can be expressed as
where a(t; T ) and b(t; T ) are the solution for the following ODE system:
Thus a(t; T ) and b(t; T ) have the following expressions:
At the same time, we can express the equilibrium value function and the conditional expected value and conditional variance with equilibrium control in terms of a(t) and b(t):
7.1. Effect of control constraints. In Figure 1 , k 1 = 5, k 2 = 0.05, T = 50, all investors will invest more in risky assets when the time is closer to the expiry. Moreover, when the time is close to the expiry, the unconstrained investor will short sell riskless assets to invest more in risky assets to get the most satisfaction. At the same time, the constrained investor and the conservative investor are not allowed to invest too much in risky assets; their upper constraints are activated so that they can invest in risky assets only at their maximum levels. However, the highest risky investment for the unconstrained investor at the expiry makes his uncertainty at time 0 become the largest, so his value function at that time will be less than the constrained investor and the conservative investor. To hedge such a large uncertainty at the expiry, the unconstrained investor will short sell the risky asset when the time is far from the expiry, but the constrained investor and the conservative investor cannot short sell, so they can put all their wealth only on riskless assets.
Effect of different risk-aversion coefficient models.
We first consider the case of large terminal risk aversion, so that all three risky investors will take the same strategy up to the expiry, and we fix k 1 = 50. In Figure 2 , we further set k 2 = 0.1, large k 1 and small k 2 maintain large risk aversion, and all three risky investors maintain a steady investment. The unconstrained investor invests less than half of his wealth over the whole time horizon even though he is allowed to invest more in risky assets, so all three investors take the same strategy. Besides, they invest less risky in midterm investments, compared with those over the long and short terms, as they hedge out the risk over short term investments. For long term investments, the risk aversion is small, so they can invest more in risky assets.
In Figures 3 and 4 , we increase k 2 to 0.2 and 0.3, respectively; then the risk aversion for the long term investor will be smaller than that in Figure 2 . Thus, the unconstrained investor will take more risky investments in the long term, and the constrained investor and the conservative investor will follow the unconstrained investor to carry out aggressive investments until the risky investments reach their maximum limit. Because of being forbidden to take too risky of investments, the performance of the constrained investor and the conservative investor will not be as good as that of the unconstrained investor since they cannot follow the unconstrained investor to take more risky investments.
Later, we set k 1 = 1 in Figures 5-7 , and thus the terminal risk aversion is small so that the unconstrained investor will short sell riskless assets at expiry. The long term investment strategy is similar to the case of k 1 = 50. The constrained investor and conservative investor cannot short sell, so they can just invest as many risky assets as they can. The unconstrained risky investments make the unconstrained investor able to perform better than the other two Tables 1 and 2 . However, the huge risky investments in the short term result in a high volatility drawback in long term investments, and thus the conservative investors perform better than the other two risky investors in Figure 5 .
risky investors in
In Figure 6 , the constrained investor has the best long term performance among all three risky investors. It is because the excessive short term investments of the unconstrained investor cause large long term uncertainty, while the conservative investor cannot follow the other two risky investors to invest more in risky assets which causes his return to be less. In Figure 7 , the allowance of long term unconstrained risky investments makes the unconstrained investor outperform the other two risky investors.
In conclusion, the unconstrained investor, constrained investor, and conservative investor can perform better than the other two in a certain value of k 1 , k 2 , and T . We observe that the long term investments of three risky investors are steady; larger k 2 will make the unconstrained investor have more risky long term investments because of smaller long term risk aversion. However, if any investor cannot follow the long term investments of the unconstrained investor because of the constraint, then his investment performance will be affected. Smaller k 1 encourages more risky investments in the short term, but it gives a drawback over long term investment performance because of the volatility, and thus the unconstrained investor will be significantly affected by this excessive risky investment in the short term. For further analysis about the nontypical observation that the constrained investor outperforms the unconstrained investor, Remark 5.4.1 in [29] provides a deep discussion in both mathematical and economical aspects. Figures 8-10 , we compare the mean-variance distribution for different investors setting T = 5, 50. We model the risk-aversion coefficient by the logit function with free varying k 1 , k 2 , and thus we can see a two-dimensional area of mean-variance distribution. We can see that the distribution area of the conservative investor is inside the distribution area of the constrained investor, but they occupy the most efficient part of the distribution area of the constrained investor. A similar relation appears between the constrained investor and unconstrained investor. Three investors share the same mean-variance distribution for small variance because they adopt the same investment strategy if the risk-aversion coefficient is large.
Mean-variance distribution between different control constraints. In
In Figures 8(a) -9, we see that the constrained investor and conservative investor are restricted by the upper bound in expected return because of constrained investment in risky assets, which explains the more conservative investor not performing well for small T .
It is also a surprise that the lower end of the mean-variance distribution of the unconstrained investor will have a shape of "2" for T = 50.
Note that [11] found the same observation that the constrained investor adopts a more efficient strategy than that of the unconstrained investor.
Conclusion.
In this paper, we studied mean-variance portfolio selection with shortselling prohibition via the time-consistent approach. For the present case that the risk aversion is inversely proportional to the current wealth, positive wealth assumption is required for the investor to remain risk averse, and so the short selling has to be prohibited (Remark 2.6). By using backward induction, the equilibrium control in the discrete time setting is shown to be linear in wealth where its coefficients can be obtained by backward recursion (Theorem 4.1). By using the extended HJB equation (Theorem 5.1), we showed that the equilibrium control in the continuous time setting is also linear in wealth with coefficients satisfying the integral equation in (Theorem 6.1); this integral equation has been shown to admit a unique solution (Theorem 6.2). We also show that the equilibrium control in the discrete time setting converges to that in the continuous time model (Theorem 6.4). Finally, some numerical comparisons of the performance for different control constraint were made.
Further extensions of our present problem could be investigated. First, one can consider the same problem with multiple risky assets; the corresponding feasible set of admissible controls is then confined to a multidimensional cone in light of the requirement of shortselling prohibition. Second, it is interesting to also consider the same problem with random parameters, but the model may not be Markovian anymore, and thus the approach in [3] cannot be directly applied. Instead, one can consider the work of [14] , in which all adapted controls are regarded as admissible controls, and hence the corresponding problem could probably be resolved; finally, it may also be crucial to compare the performances of the respective equilibrium controls among different admissible sets, [3] and [14] , as we can perceive that the equilibrium control over the smaller admissible set can outperform the corresponding Figure 10 . The mean-variance distribution for different constraints: (a) unconstrained investor, (b) constrained investor, (c) conservative investor, given the expiry T = 50, the current time t = 0, and current wealth x = 1. The y-axis represents the equilibrium conditional expected return, and the x-axis represents the equilibrium conditional variance.
one over the larger one.
Similarly, note that r k + α k C k ≥ 0, and so (r k + α k C k ) 2 ≤ e 2(r+α) , (r k + α k C k ) 2 + σ 2 k C 2 k ≤ e 2(r+α) + (e σ 2 − 1)e 2(r+α) = e [2(r+α)+σ 2 ] .
On the other hand, by completing the square in C k ,
We claim that Lipschitz continuity of c follows if d(t) can be shown to be uniformly bounded and Lipschitz continuous. With the same approaches as for (6.10) and (6.11), we can prove that d(t) is uniformly bounded: −γ ≤ d(t) ≤ e (r+α)T + γ, and is also Lipschitz continuous. Lemma B.3. Fix an > 0. a(t) and b(t) are defined as in (6.14), c(t) satisfies (6.6), and A n , B n , and C n are given in Theorem 4.1 with coefficients as specified in (6.13). There exists K > 0 such that for all n,
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Based on the previous lemmas and theorem, we can now deduce that the solutions in the discrete time model converge to that in the continuous time counterpart as the time interval goes to zero.
Proof of Theorem 6.4. This theorem follows by applying Lemmas B.2 and B.3 and Theorem B.5:
